

सिद्धान्तबिन्दु

SIDDHĀNTABINDU

of

श्रीमदधुसूदनाश्रयः

Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

A Commentary on the Daśaślokī of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya

With English Translation based on S.N. Sastri

Introduction — Introduction

Invocatory Verse — Invocatory Verse

ॐ श्रीविश्वेश्वराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीशङ्कराय नमः ।

With prostrations to Śrī Viśveśvara who is a re-incarnation of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, and who is the preceptor for the whole world, I am composing some kind of a treatise for the instruction of those who do not have the inclination to undertake a detailed study of the scriptures that expound Vedānta.

§1

ॐ श्रीशङ्कराय नमः ।
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ॐ श्रीविश्वेश्वराय नमः ।

The revered Ācārya Bhagavān Śrī Śaṅkara, being desirous of lifting all living beings (out of this transmigratory existence) either immediately or mediately, composed the 'Daśaśloki' for the purpose of expounding briefly the means of discriminating the not-self from the self which is eternal (nitya), free from the stain of ignorance (śuddha), self-luminous (buddha) and free from the bondage of agency, etc. (mukta).

Note: Liberation will result immediately from hearing the Daśaśloki for those who have attained complete purity of mind and thereby become most competent spiritual aspirants (Uttama-adhikārī). For others, hearing should be followed by reflection and meditation.

§2 — Objection

ॐ श्रीशङ्कराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीविश्वेश्वराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीशङ्कराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीविश्वेश्वराय नमः ।

Objection: Every one discriminates the not-self which is referred to as 'this' from the self which is denoted by the word 'I' when he says 'I am', but, in spite of that, he experiences sorrow; therefore since only what is already known is being taught, and since it does not produce any benefit, the exposition of the nature of the self is futile.

§3 — Answer

ॐ श्रीशङ्कराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीविश्वेश्वराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीशङ्कराय नमः ।
ॐ श्रीविश्वेश्वराय नमः ।

Answer: It is not so. Even the body and the senses which should in fact be referred to as 'this' because they are all illumined by the pure Consciousness (and are therefore insentient), are denoted by the word 'I' due to non-discrimination caused by illusion (resulting from ignorance). Because of this (non-discrimination), suffering, etc., are attributed (wrongly) to the pure self. This is removed along with its cause (ignorance) by the knowledge of the identity of the individual self and Brahman declared in the scriptures. Therefore, since what is taught is something that is not known previously and since it does produce a benefit (removal of sorrow, etc.) the exposition of the nature of the self is not futile.

Note: When a person says 'I am so and so', 'I live in such and such a place', etc., he is referring to the aggregate of the body, mind and senses as 'I'. Actually, the body, senses and mind are insentient and, like any object outside the body, they deserve to be referred to only as 'this'. The self, which is pure consciousness, can alone be rightly denoted by the word 'I'. This failure to discriminate between the self on the one hand, and the body, mind and senses on the other, is the reason for every one attributing to himself the sorrows, etc., which pertain only to the body, mind and sense organs. The scriptures point out that the individual self is different from the aggregate of body, mind and senses and is identical with the supreme Self or Brahman, which is the indwelling self of all beings. A person who, as a result of this knowledge, dissociates himself from the body, etc., is free from all sorrow.

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The knowledge of the self can be acquired only from the Mahāvākyas in Vedānta (the Upaniṣads) such as 'That thou art' (Ch.Up. 6.8.7), 'I am Brahman' (Br. Up. 1.4.10). A sentence conveys its meaning only through the meanings of the words in it. The meanings of the words in the above sentences which would be in consonance with the sense of the sentence as a whole can be known only from the scriptures and not from any other source. This is like the meanings of the words 'yūpa' and 'āhavanīya' which can be known only from the Vedas.

Note: The words 'that', 'thou', 'I', have certain meanings in ordinary parlance, but that is not the sense in which they are used in the above sentences. The senses in which they are used here can be known only from the Upaniṣads. 'Yūpa' is the name of the pole to which the sacrificial animal is tied in a sacrifice. 'Āhavanīya' is one of the three fires in which the sacrifice is offered.

§5

"तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1)

Thus, the sentences such as the one starting with "That from which all these beings are born", (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) which deal with creation, etc., give the primary meaning of the word 'That'. Sentences such as "Brahman is Reality, Consciousness and Infinite" (Tai.Up.2.1.1) give the implied meaning of the same word.

§6

"तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1)

Similarly, sentences such as, "Just as a big fish swims to both the banks, eastern and western, even so does this infinite entity move between the two states of dream and waking" (Br. Up. 4.3.18), which deal with the states of waking, dream and deep sleep, give the primary meaning of the word 'thou'. Sentences such as "This entity which is identified with the intellect, which is amid the organs, and which is the effulgence within the heart" (Br. Up. 4.3.7), and "You cannot see the seer of sight" (Br. Up. 3.4.2), present the implied meaning of 'thou'.

§7

"तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1) "तत् त्वं जगत्सर्वं सृजति" (Tai.Up. 3.1.1)

Since it is found that sentences such as 'That thou art' (which declare the identity of 'that' and 'thou') cannot logically apply to the entities denoted by the primary meanings of these terms, we naturally think of applying this identity to the pure, unconditioned jīva and Brahman, by having recourse to the implied (or secondary) meanings of these terms which are known from the subordinate sentences. This is also because it is accepted that it is the pure unconditioned witness consciousness that is experienced in deep sleep. Moreover, though the terms 'reality', 'consciousness', etc., which are intended to denote the non-dual Brahman can, by their primary meaning, denote the consciousness conditioned by the limiting adjuncts, they have their purport in the pure consciousness alone and so a mental impression arises only about that part (of the primary meaning, namely, pure consciousness).

तत्त्वज्ञानेन तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं
तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं

There is no tautology (in the sentence 'That thou art') because there is an apparent difference between the primary senses of the two terms. Since the implied meanings are identical, a non-relational sense is conveyed.

Note: It cannot be said that in the Mahāvākya there is tautology—saying the same thing over again in different words—on the ground that two words with the same meaning, namely 'that' and 'thou' are used. There is no such defect because the primary meanings of the two words are different. At the same time, this difference is only apparent and not substantial, because the implied senses are identical, namely, pure consciousness.

§12

तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं
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When a sentence is non-relational, denoting an unconditioned entity, the mental impression created by the words in that sentence is also that of an unconditioned entity, if the words are understood in a manner that is in consonance with the sense of the sentence as a whole. This is in conformity with our experience. The recollection brought about by a sentence is that of a conditioned entity only when the entity denoted by the words in it is conditioned. In the present instance the sense of the sentence (the Mahāvākya) is unconditioned (and therefore non-relational), because that alone, being right knowledge, has the capacity to destroy nescience.

§13

तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्त्वज्ञानं
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It cannot be said that a word can be given an implied meaning only if the entity intended to be denoted by the implied meaning has a special characteristic. The primary or implied meanings of the words in a sentence are those which are in consonance with the sense of the sentence as a whole.

*Note: In the sentence "There are huts on the Gaṅgā", the implied meaning (lakṣya-
artha) of the term 'Gaṅgā' is the bank of the river. An objection may be raised that
resort to the implied meaning of a word is possible only when the particular implied
meaning intended to be given to the word has some characteristic (known as
'lakṣyatā-avacchedaka'). This objection is rejected by pointing out that what is
necessary is only that the implied sense should be in consonance with the idea
intended to be conveyed by the sentence.*

§14 — Objection

एतत् तदर्थं प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् एव प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् एव तत्
प्रमाणं तदर्थं एव प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् एव
प्रमाणसामर्थ्यात् तदर्थं —

Objection: Since the import of the Mahāvākya becomes known through the understanding of the meaning of the words in it from the subsidiary Vedāntic sentences themselves, and since the Mahāvākya is itself self-valid (a valid means of knowledge by itself), it is reasonable to conclude that the Mahāvākya itself can cause the cessation of nescience and its effects. So what is the need for an enquiry?

§15 — Answer

तदर्थं, तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं तदर्थं
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Answer: It is true that Vedāntic statements, being by themselves authoritative, can give rise to the direct realization of the unconditioned Self. But because of the obstruction caused by the doubts arising from the contradictory views of various schools, the Vedāntic statements are not able to destroy the ignorance of those whose minds have not attained the necessary maturity. By enquiry the doubts are removed and then cessation of ignorance invariably results. Therefore enquiry is undertaken for the refutation of the contradictory views which are the cause of the doubts.

First Section

Determination of the Meaning of 'Thou'

§16

Now, the contradictory views about the meaning of the word 'thou' are first taken up. Though the entity denoted by the word 'that' deserves great respect since it is the ultimate import of the scriptures, the entity denoted by the word 'thou' deserves to be given more importance because it is that entity that attains liberation, which is the fruit of the scriptures.

Note: Strictly speaking, since 'thou' and 'that' are identical, there can be no question of the one being the attainer and the other the attained. So the language used here is only a concession to the popular notion that liberation is 'attained' on the removal of nescience.

§17 — Survey of Philosophical Schools

The Cārvākas say that the meaning of the word 'thou' (i.e. the individual self) is only the four elements (air, fire, water and earth) modified in the form of the body. Some other Cārvākas hold that the eye, etc., individually is the self. Others hold that it is all these organs together. Some say that it is the mind and some that it is the vital air. The Saugatas (Buddhist idealists) say that it is momentary consciousness. The Mādhyamika Buddhists hold that it is the void. The Jains say that it is something different from the body and of the size of the body. The Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara school hold that it is the agent and enjoyer and is insentient and all-pervading. The Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhaṭṭa school say that it is both sentient and insentient. According to the Sāṅkhyas and the followers of Patañjali's Yoga the self is pure consciousness and only an enjoyer (not agent). The followers of the Upaniṣads hold that the self is looked upon as an

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agent, etc., only because of nescience and that it is in reality free from attributes, and is supreme bliss and consciousness.

§18

एतन्महोपाध्यायः पञ्चमोऽध्यायः । एतन्महोपाध्यायः पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ।
एतन्महोपाध्यायः पञ्चमोऽध्यायः । एतन्महोपाध्यायः पञ्चमोऽध्यायः । —

Thus, because of the different views held by the various schools, doubt arises about the nature of the self that is consciousness and is known in a general way as 'I'. Therefore, in order to determine specifically what is the basis of the notion 'I', the revered Ācārya says:

एतन्महोपाध्यायः पञ्चमोऽध्यायः — Verse 1

अहं न भूमी न वायु न अग्नि न जल न अether न इन्द्रियं न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न

"I am not the element earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor ether, nor any of the organs individually, nor all the elements and organs together as a whole. Because of variability (of the limiting adjuncts in the states of waking and dream), the self exists by itself only in deep sleep (without the limiting adjuncts in the form of the senses, mind, etc.). I am that most auspicious, attributeless, non-dual entity who alone remains (when all duality is negated)."

§19 — Explanation of Terms

अहं न भूमी न वायु न अग्नि न जल न अether न इन्द्रियं न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न

This is the meaning: Aham—the basis of the cognition 'I'. Ekaḥ—without a second. Avīśiṣṭaḥ—what is not negated even when all duality is negated. Śivaḥ—of the nature of supreme bliss and consciousness, that alone being most auspicious. Kevalaḥ—devoid of attributes.

§20

अहं न भूमी न वायु न अग्नि न जल न अether न इन्द्रियं न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न
अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न अणु न

Therefore the meaning is that the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads, that the basis of the cognition 'I' is the non-dual supreme bliss-consciousness which is beyond the scope of all means of knowledge, is superior. To

establish this, the view that the body itself is the self is first taken up with the intention of refuting the views of all other schools. So it has been said: "Not the element earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor ether". The word 'I' is to be connected with each negation. I am not what is called the earth; the earth is not what is known as 'I'. Thus absence of mutual identity is to be understood.

§21

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Though this school (Cārvāka) does not claim that each of the elements such as earth separately is the self, but it only says that their combination is the self, still, for refuting their view that the body is the self, the rejection of each of the elements separately is resorted to, because the concept of a combination has no place in the Cārvāka school for the following reasons: (1) they do not accept the idea of a combination as distinguished from its constituents, (2) they do not accept such relations as 'conjunction', because that is possible only if they admit a fifth element (namely, ether) and (3) in their school there is no entity that can bring about a combination.

§22-23

[illegible]

Though, according to those who hold the view that there are only four elements, ether cannot be the cause of the body since it is merely absence of covering, is eternal and non-existent, it is rejected here because according to Advaita Vedānta ether is accepted as existent and a cause of the body, etc., and could therefore be claimed to be the self (by the Cārvākas). Or, it may be said that the rejection of the view that the body is the self ends with the statement 'not air'. The statement 'not ether' is for rejecting the Buddhist doctrine that the void is the self, since the word 'kham' has the same import as the word 'void'.

§24

[illegible]

By the words 'not an organ' the view that any one of the organs is the self is rejected. By the statement 'not their aggregate', the view that the self is the aggregate of the elements and of the organs which have collectively become the body is rejected.

§25

[illegible]

The difference is that previously the possibility of a combination was not admitted and the view that each of the elements individually was the self was rejected, but now, even admitting a combination, the view that the self could be such a combination of the elements has been rejected. By the rejection of the elements, the vital air and mind, which are products of the elements are also rejected. By the rejection of the mind, the Buddhist view that momentary consciousness is the self is also rejected, since it is only a modification of the mind. Consequently, the Vaiśeṣika theory in which the self which is different from the body (and the mind) is accepted to be the agent and enjoyer also stands rejected, because agency and enjoyership pertain to the mind. This is because according to Advaita Vedānta knowledge, desire, happiness, etc. are in the mind. The Śruti says, "Desire, resolve, etc., are all nothing but the mind" (Br. Up. 1.5.3). Therefore it is established that all the views starting from the view that the self is the body, up to those which consider the self to be merely an enjoyer, are untenable.

§26

[illegible]

The reason for this is given: Because they (body, mind, senses) are variable; i.e. they are always changing and so perishable. The self cannot have either antecedent non-existence (non-existence before origination), or annihilative non-existence (non-existence after destruction), because the self is not limited by space and time (and has therefore neither origination nor destruction, being eternal). Things which are so limited, such as a pot, cannot be the self, and cannot know their antecedent non-existence or

§27

Since duality is not real (mithyā), it has existence only because of its having attained identification with the reality of the substratum. As in the case of nacre-silver, etc., it is illogical to say that there is absence of identification of the superimposed with the substratum.

§28

Therefore the self is not the counter-correlative of non-existence. The body, senses, etc., are counter-correlatives of non-existence. Therefore these (body, etc.) are not the self. The essence of the conclusion is that these (body, etc.) are indescribable (as real or unreal) and are merely superimposed by beginningless, indescribable nescience on the self which is self-luminous pure consciousness, even though it is without a second.

A doubt may arise here. Since it is admitted that the self is of the nature of consciousness, and since there is no consciousness during deep sleep as seen from the fact that a person who wakes up from deep sleep recollects that he was totally ignorant and knew nothing during sleep, how can the self be said to be a constant factor (in all the three states)? In reply to this it is said "Its existence can be clearly established only in the state of deep sleep".

This is the meaning: Since the self is the witness in deep sleep, it is not non-existent then. If it were, the recollection, “I was ignorant” would not be possible. Even though the knower, means of knowledge, knowledge and the object known vary, the witness of their existence and non-existence remains unchanged in all the three periods of time.

Objection (by the Tarkikas): The knower is the substratum of knowledge (i.e. the place where the knowledge rests). He is himself the agent and the enjoyer and, like a lamp, he illumines himself and everything else. So he does not need another witness as a pot does.

Ans: It is not so. Since the knower of a particular knowledge (who, according to Advaita, is the mind itself assuming the shape of the object known, with the reflection of consciousness in it) undergoes changes, he cannot be the witness of his own changes. What is an object of knowledge cannot be the knower. The knower of a particular knowledge is a changing entity (because he is different after the origin of that knowledge from what he was before) and is therefore himself an object of knowledge. Only a single changeless entity can be a witness of everything (of all changes).

Objection: We do not accept a single, immutable, attributeless witness because there is no authority for that.

Ans: Not so (there is authority). “Everything shines because of his shining; because of his effulgence all these shine variously” (Katha Up. 2.2.15), “You cannot see the seer of sight” (Br. Up. 3.4.2), “He is never seen, but is the seer” (3.7.23), “There is no seer other than him” (3.7.23)—by such lofty authoritative statements in Vedanta it (the self) is itself anointed as the witness of everything.

Obj: It is indeed incomprehensible (like a magical trick) that, leaving aside the substrata of knowledge, which are free from deceit (or which are capable of undergoing changes), the lofty authority makes something that is fraudulent (or incapable of change), and which is not the substratum of knowledge, the witness of everything.

Ans: True. This is indeed incomprehensible, like dream, because it is the play of nescience.

Obj: Even then, since a knowable object like pot is insentient, how can the mind be the substratum of knowledge?

Ans: The objection is not tenable. Since the mind is pure like a mirror, it can receive the reflection of pure consciousness (Brahman-Atman). Or, identity with pure consciousness is attributed to the mind because of superimposition on pure consciousness.

Obj: How can an object without form and without parts have a reflection?

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), “This self is Brahman” (Br. Up. 2.5.19), “Brahman is Reality, Consciousness and Infinitude” (Tai. 2.1.1), “Brahman is Consciousness and Bliss” (Br. Up. 3.9.28), “The self that is free from sin” (Cha. 8.7.1), “The Brahman that is immediate and direct; the self that is within all” (Br. Up. 3.4.1), “That which transcends hunger and thirst, grief, delusion, decay and death” (Br. Up. 3.5.1), “He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state (of dream), for this infinite being is free from all attachment” (Br. Up. 4.3.15)—Sruti statements such as these declare that the self is not an agent nor an experiencer, and is itself Brahman which is of the nature of supreme bliss.

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Thus, since the only course left is to conclude that this (the cognition 'I am a man, etc.,') is only a delusion, it is necessary to postulate a proper cause for this delusion. That cause is found to be something whose existence is established as superimposed on the non-dual self, from the fact of the appearance of the dharmi (the entity who describes himself as 'I am a man, etc.'). That cause is the indescribable ignorance which is experienced by the witness-consciousness in the form 'I do not know'. This is not of the nature of non-existence (in the form of mere absence of knowledge). Since it has been said that knowledge is eternal, there can never be absence of knowledge.

\$56

. Equally, there will be self-contradiction if it is said that neither of them is known, because the presence of a thing cannot be negated without knowing both the place (If nescience is claimed to be only absence of knowledge of atman), then there will be self-contradiction if it is said that the dharmi, 'I' and the pratiyogi, absence of knowledge of the atman, are both known where the thing is negated and the object that is negated; for example it cannot be said that there is no pot in a particular place unless that place and the pot are both known.

"And [this ignorance cannot be mere absence] because there would arise a contradiction (*vyāghāta*) between the knowledge and ignorance that have the substrate (*dharmīn*) as their counter-correlate (*pratīyogīn*) Cld tr

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This nescience cannot be of the nature of delusion, doubt or a succession of mental impressions caused by delusion or doubt, because it is directly experienced. Delusions, doubts and their impressions which relate to the past or to the future cannot be experienced directly at the present time. This nescience cannot be mere negation because it is something which covers or hides (the atman) and is the material cause of the delusion in the form 'I am a man, etc'. The self cannot be the cause of this delusion because it is immutable. Nor can the mind, etc., be the cause of the delusion, because they are themselves products of nescience.

§58 “တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်း၊ တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်းတမ်း” (တရား.ဝ. ဝ.ဝ) တို့ကို တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်းတမ်း ဝ “တရားရုံး တို့ တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်းတမ်း တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်းတမ်း” (တရား.ဝ. ဝ.ဝဝ), “တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်းတမ်း တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်း” (တရ.ဝ. ဝ.ဝ.ဝဝ), “တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်းတမ်းတမ်း” (တရ.ဝ. ဝ.ဝ.ဝ), “တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာတမ်းတမ်းတမ်း” (တရ.ဝဝ. ဝ.ဝ.ဝ.ဝ), “တရားရုံး တရားရုံး တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်းတမ်း” (တရား.ဝ. ဝ.ဝ) တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်းတမ်း ဝ တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်းတမ်းတမ်းတမ်းတမ်း တရားရုံး တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်းတမ်းတမ်းတမ်းတမ်း တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာ တရားရုံးတော်ဝင်စာတမ်း တရားရုံးတော်ဝင် စာ

Śruti statements such as—“(They realized) the power of the supreme Being which is concealed by its own *gunas* (or effects)” (Sve. 1.3), which speaks of the power as constituted of the *gunas*; “Know *maya* to be *prakṛiti* and the wielder of *maya* to be the supreme Lord” (Sve.4.10); “The supreme Being is perceived as having manifold forms because of *maya*” (Br. Up. 2.5.19); “They are covered by ignorance” (Ch. 8.3.2); “Covered by mist” (Tai. Sam. 4.6.2.2); “Then finally cessation of all *maya*”: (Sve.1.10);—show that *maya* which is nescience, is indescribable, unreal, removable by the knowledge of the Reality, is the cause of the superimposition of itself and others (such as ego, mind, senses, body).

[illegible]

Defects such as self-dependence do not arise here because nescience has no beginning and the self-luminous self is itself pure consciousness. Thus, the ego is superimposed on pure consciousness on which nescience has already been superimposed. On that are superimposed the qualities of the ego such as desire, resolve, etc., and the qualities of the sense organs such as one-eyedness, deafness, etc.

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Since the senses are not directly perceivable, they are themselves not superimposed. (No one says, "I am the eye or ear", but one may say, "I am one-eyed", or "I am deaf". Thus only the quality of the sense organs is superimposed and not the organ itself). On that the gross body is superimposed, but only with reference to its qualities, in the form, "I am a man". (The body is itself not superimposed, but only its qualities). There is no superimposition of the body itself, because nobody has a perception in the form "I am this body". Only the qualities of the body such as stoutness, etc., are superimposed. (One says "I am stout, I am lean, I am tall, etc." These are all qualities of the physical body and not of the self, but they are attributed to oneself by superimposition).

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On that there is the superimposition of the well-being or otherwise of son, wife, etc. (A man feels happy when his son, wife, etc., are happy and the opposite when they are unhappy. Thus there is the superimposition of the happiness, unhappiness, success, failure, etc., of persons near and dear to him). Similarly, there is also the superimposition of consciousness on the ego and up to the gross body. This superimposition is only by association and it is known as *samsarga adhyaasa*.

§62 本規則自中華民國八十四年一月一日起施行。其施行日期由財政部定之。

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There is gradation in attachment depending on the gradation in proximity between the substratum and what is superimposed. It is said by the Vartikakara (Suresvaracharya):— “The son is dearer than wealth, one’s own body is dearer than the son, the senses are dearer than the body, the mind is dearer than the senses, the self is dearer than the mind and is the most loved”. (Brihadaranyakopanishad bhashya vartikam, 1.4.1031). Pinda—the physical body; prana—the inner organ (mind); That the senses are dearer than the physical body is patent from the common experience of a person instinctively closing his eyes at the fall of a weapon or when there is a sudden downpour. Because of the mutual superimposition, the consciousness and the inert (self and not-self) become bound together (and appear as one inseparable whole).

[illegible]

If it is said that there is superimposition of only one entity on another, (and not mutual superimposition of two entities), then the other (the entity on which there is superimposition) will not be perceived (just as the rope is not perceived when there is superimposition of snake on it). In a delusion, only that which is superimposed is perceived. There has therefore necessarily to be mutual superimposition as in the case of the erroneous group cognition

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The self, with nescience as limiting adjunct, is not discriminated from its own reflection in nescience (chidabhasa) which has become identified with nescience. It is therefore described as inner controller, witness, the cause of the universe, and Isvara. Because of non-discrimination from its own reflection in the intellect, which has become identified with the intellect, the same self is known as jiva, agent, enjoyer, and knower. This is the view of the revered Vartikakara (Sureshvaracharya).

[illegible]

Since the intellect in each body is different, the reflection of consciousness is also different. Therefore the consciousness identified with it also appears to be different. Nescience is however the same everywhere and so there is no difference in the consciousness reflected in it. So the witness-consciousness which is not discriminated from it does not ever appear different; i.e. it is only one.

[illegible]

According to this view (aabhaasa-vaada) the identity of 'That' and 'Thou' is only through exclusive secondary signification (jahal-lakshana), because the primary meaning of the limiting adjunct with the reflection of consciousness in it is totally abandoned and the reflection, being different from both sentient and insentient, is indeterminable. It has been said in Samkshepasariraka:— "If the words 'Brahman' and 'aham' primarily signify respectively avidya with the reflection of consciousness in it and the ego (intellect with the reflection of consciousness in it), then jahallakshana (exclusive secondary signification) has to be resorted to (for getting the import of the statement 'aham Brahma asmi')." (I.169).

\$70 — **Средств на оплату труда работников, занятых в сфере культуры и искусства, не облагается налогом на прибыль организаций.**

"[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]" ([REDACTED].[REDACTED].[REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

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It cannot be said that, since bondage is only for the reflection and liberation is only for the pure consciousness, the locations of bondage and liberation are different; and that no one would make an effort for his own destruction. This is because bondage has been attributed to the pure consciousness itself, through the reflection. It has been said by the revered Vartikakara:—“This alone is our bondage that we look upon ourselves as a transmigrating entity”. Therefore, the reflection of pure consciousness is itself the bondage and its cessation is liberation. There is nothing inconsistent in this.

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Or, pure consciousness not discriminated from the reflection is also (to be included in) the primary sense of the terms 'That' and 'Thou'. In that case, since a part of the sense is not abandoned, there is no inconsistency in holding that exclusive-cum-inclusive secondary implication is to be adopted. It is this view that is spoken of as aabhaasa-vaada.

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本條所稱之「中華民國政府」指中華民國政府。

The view of the author of Vivarana is that pure consciousness limited by nescience is Isvara and is the original which is reflected. Pure consciousness reflected in nescience limited by the internal organ and its samskaras is the jiva.

[illegible]

The view of the author of Samkshepasariraka is that pure consciousness reflected in nescience is Isvara. Pure consciousness reflected in the intellect is the jiva. Pure consciousness not limited by nescience, which is the original, is pure (Brahman).

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According to both these views (Vivarana and Samkshepasariraka), jivas are different from one another because their intellects (minds) are different. Since the reflection is considered to be real, exclusive-cum-inclusive implication is to be resorted to for determining the sense of the terms 'That' and 'Thou', etc. This is known as the reflection theory.

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According to Vachaspathimisra, pure consciousness which is the content
 (object) of nescience is Isvara. The locus of nescience is the jiva. In this view
 multiplicity of jivas is due to multiplicity of nescience. Thus the universe is
 different for each jiva, because the jiva is the material cause of the universe
 since it has nescience as limiting adjunct. The recognition of the universe as
 the same by all is due to extreme similarity. Isvara is metaphorically
 described as the cause of the universe because of being the substratum of
 the jivas, nescience and the universe. This is the limitation theory.

§76 According to Vachaspathimisra, pure consciousness which is the content
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 described as the cause of the universe because of being the substratum of
 the jivas, nescience and the universe. This is the limitation theory.

Pure consciousness which is the original (which is what is reflected), with
 nescience as its limiting adjunct is Isvara. The reflection of consciousness in
 nescience is the jiva. Or, pure consciousness not limited by nescience is
 Isvara. Consciousness limited by nescience is the jiva. This is the main
 Vedanta theory, known as the theory of a single jiva. This itself is called
 'drishtisrishtivaada'. In this view the jiva himself is the material and
 efficient cause of the universe through his own nescience. All the objects
 perceived are illusory (like things seen in dream). The delusion that there
 are many jivas is only due to there being many bodies. Liberation is attained
 by the single jiva on realization of the self as a result of the perfection of
 hearing, reflection, etc., with the help of the Guru and the scriptures which
 are all conjured up by him. The statements about Suka and others having
 attained liberation are only by way of eulogy. In the Mahavakya the term
 'That' signifies by implication consciousness not limited by nescience, like
 the terms 'infinite', 'reality', etc. Such differences in views within the main
 framework should be known by inference.

§77 Since, there cannot be different opinions about a real thing, how can
 such mutually contradictory views be valid? So, what view is to be accepted
 and what is to be rejected?

Obj: Since there cannot be different opinions about a real thing, how can
 such mutually contradictory views be valid? So, what view is to be accepted
 and what is to be rejected?

Who says that different opinions are not possible about a real thing? It is seen that the same object is seen as a pillar or a man or a demon, etc. If it is said that the views there are not correct, because they arise only in a person's mind, but this distinction as jiva, Isvara, etc., is based on the scriptures, then (the answer is):— You are indeed very clever.

The scriptures have as their main purport the nature of the non-dual self, because that is what is fruitful and not known. The concepts of distinctions such as jiva, Isvara, etc., which are only creations of the human mind, are merely repeated by the scriptures, because they are useful for knowing the Reality. The maxim is that in the presence of what is fruitful, its auxiliary is not fruitful. Even the scriptures may state something that is merely the outcome of delusion (if that serves the main purpose).

There is no possibility of the knowledge of the non-dual reality being affected by this knowledge of duality (since non-duality alone is real). Even when the knowledge of duality such as the knowledge of a pot has arisen, only the knowledge of the 'non-dual existence' part which was previously not known can be considered to be valid. (The knowledge of the pot in the form 'The pot is' consists of the knowledge of its form together with its existence. Of these two, only the existence part is real and the form is merely superimposed). Knowledge and ignorance must necessarily have the same locus and the same content. Ignorance cannot be considered to exist with regard to an inert object since no purpose is served by the application of a valid means of knowledge to it. Every means of knowledge becomes a valid means of knowledge only if it makes known a thing which was not known previously (i.e. which was covered by ignorance). An inert object is described as not known only because the consciousness limited by that object is not known. A valid means of knowledge is one that makes known

what was not known. Otherwise even recollection would become valid knowledge.

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Thus, everywhere in Vedānta, when there are such contradictions, this is the answer. The Vartikakara says:— “All the different means by which people can attain knowledge of the self should be understood to be valid. These means are unlimited in number”.

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We have declared hundreds of times that what is opposed to the import of the sruti (which is Brahman) should be rejected. Therefore such differences in views are of little consequence. The jiva undergoes transmigration because he is under the control of his limiting adjunct. Since the supreme Isvara controls his limiting adjunct, he has qualities such as omniscience. Thus the distinction between them is logically explained.

[illegible]

Obj: Let it be that the distinction between jiva and Isvara is due to the effect of nescience. But how do you explain the distinctions such as means of valid knowledge, object of knowledge, etc., with regard to different persons and different objects?

[illegible]

Answer: Avidya, though limited, cannot stand scrutiny because it is indescribable, being an object of knowledge, inert, and perishable. Possessing the twin powers of concealment and projection, it covers the all-pervading self which is pure consciousness. It is like the finger placed in front of the eye concealing the orbit of the sun. If the eye itself were covered (by the finger), then the finger itself would not be seen. (So the finger does not cover the eye, but it covers only the sun which is much bigger). Projection (of an unreal object) cannot occur unless the substratum

itself is covered. This avidya becomes modified as the entire universe as a result of the actions of the jivas prompted by the impressions of past actions. This avidya becomes identified with pure consciousness because of the reflection of the consciousness in itself. As a result, all the effects of avidya (the entire universe) become permeated by consciousness through its reflection.

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Since consciousness is like a lamp which illumines everything within its range, the pure consciousness that is the cause of the universe illumines everything always without depending on any means of knowledge and it is therefore omniscient. Therefore there is no need of any distinction such as means of knowledge, object of knowledge, etc., with regard to it. But it is necessary in the case of the jiva, because he is limited by the intellect which is his limiting adjunct. Because of this, the jiva experiences only that object with which his mind, which has the capacity to take the reflection of consciousness, is associated (through the senses), and only at the particular time when it is so associated. Therefore there is no possibility of any mix-up.

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Thus this is the method here. (This is how cognition of an object takes place). The internal organ (mind) which is inside the body, which pervades the whole body, which is created out of the subtle elements with a preponderance of sattvaguna, which is a modification of nescience, and which is extremely clear like a mirror, stretches out through the eyes and other sense organs, pervades objects such as a pot which are capable of being known, and takes the form of that object, just like molten copper (poured into a mould). Like the light of the sun, it (the mind) can suddenly contract or expand. (The light covers small as well as big objects). The mind, being a substance with parts, is capable of undergoing changes. It is

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In the school that holds the view that the jiva has the internal organ as limiting adjunct, as well as in the school in which the jiva is omnipresent, devoid of the relationship of identity-cum-difference with objects, and is a reflection in avidya, the mental modification serves to connect the knower-consciousness with the object and also to remove the veil of avidya covering the consciousness which is the substratum of the object. In the third school according to which the jiva is limited by avidya, is all-pervading, and covered (by avidya), since the jiva itself is the material cause of the universe and is therefore connected with all objects, the mental modification serves only to remove the covering of avidya (on the object-consciousness). This is the difference.

Obj: By a single knowledge such as that of a pot the covering of ignorance is removed and so there should be immediate liberation because there is only one ignorance. Even in the view that ignorances are manifold, each jiva has only one ignorance as limiting adjunct and so the same should apply.

Answer: No, because the veil of ignorance is said to be only suppressed (rendered powerless) by the vritti (and not destroyed), just as a gem which obstructs the heat of fire is counteracted by a mantra and made incapable of obstructing the heat. The ignorance which operates before the rise of a mental modification (vritti) generated by a pramana and which (ignorance) has the capacity to create the notion that a particular object does not exist and is not perceptible even when that object actually exists and is perceptible, is what is called a veil (or covering). When the vritti arises, the capacity of the ignorance to create such a wrong notion is stultified and so it is as good as the ignorance not existing even though it does exist, because it is rendered incapable of achieving its purpose of veiling the object. Therefore it is said to be suppressed.

Obj: If that is so, then since avidya will not be destroyed even by the knowledge of Brahman (as one's real nature), there can be no liberation at all.

Answer: It is not so, because it is accepted that avidya is destroyed by the knowledge of the meaning of the mahavakyas such as 'Thou art that'. It destroys avidya because it is valid knowledge of Brahman which is the

content of avidya. The knowledge of the import of the mahavakyas alone is valid knowledge because its content is never contradicted. The knowledge acquired through means of knowledge such as perception relates to things which are liable to be negated and it is therefore an illusion, but from the empirical standpoint it is considered to be valid knowledge. The fact that the destruction of ignorance by knowledge (as opposed to mere suppressing) is not seen anywhere else (except in the case of Brahman-knowledge) is of no consequence, because the destruction of nescience by Brahman-knowledge is a matter of actual experience (by the enlightened). Since this (experience) is not otherwise accountable, the conclusion that avidya is destroyed by Brahman-knowledge is most valid. It has been said:—“If it (the actual state of affairs) cannot be accounted for otherwise, the proposition that accounts for the actual state of affairs crushes the objection to accepting what is not seen elsewhere; that alone is most powerful”.

[illegible]

Or, (taking the view held by some previous teachers that knowledge of an object destroys the ignorance covering the object and does not merely suppress it), the ignorances that cover objects such as pot are only modes of the primal ignorance. Since ignorance is in the position of an antecedent non-existence of knowledge, it has to be accepted that there are as many ignorances as there are knowledges. Since only one ignorance is destroyed by one knowledge, though the veil of ignorance covering an object such as pot is destroyed by the knowledge of the particular object, there is no illogicality (in the view that ignorance of Brahman cannot be destroyed by the destruction of the ignorance covering an object).

[illegible]

Obj: Is the covering removed by any of the means of knowledge (other than perception) such as inference, etc., or is it not? In the first alternative (if it is removed), even the erroneous perception such as the yellowness of a conch should be removed by the inferential knowledge that a conch is white. Confusion about the directions should also cease by inference, etc. Since the cause of the illusion is the ignorance of the substratum, the illusion should cease when the ignorance of the substratum ceases. By the same reasoning the ignorance of Brahman should cease by the mere inferential knowledge of Brahman based on reasoning and there will be no

§101 本規則施行期日以後發生之事件，其應適用之法律，除本規則另有規定外，依下列各款之規定：

The second (that the object is not manifest) is removed only by direct perception. The rule is that the knowledge which has a particular locus and a particular content destroys only the ignorance which is in the same locus and has the same content. Since in indirect cognition there is no contact between the sense organ and the object, it is located only in the mind. There arises contact between the sense organ and the object only in direct perception, and so the knowledge is located in both the object and the mind in this case. It has been said:— “The cause of the notion that the object does not exist is removed by indirect cognition. The cause of the notion that the object is not manifest is removed by direct perception”. Therefore, since the covering which creates the notion of non-existence of the object is destroyed by inference, etc., the cognition that the object exists arises. Since the covering which causes non-manifestation of the object is not destroyed (by inference, etc.), the erroneous perception, which is due to a

cause (namely, the jaundice in the case of the conch appearing as yellow) does not cease.

§102

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Therefore, the attribution of agency and enjoyership, which are the qualities of the mind, to the Self which is devoid of all qualities, because of identification of the Self with the mind due to nescience, is understandable. Obj: Since you (Advaitin) adopt the theory of anirvachaniyakhyati, according to which the superimposed thing is neither real nor unreal but is indescribable, it follows that the qualities of agency, etc., superimposed on the Self are indescribable and arise in the Self. Consequently, agency, enjoyership, etc., should be of two kinds, namely, empirical and illusory.

§103 [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

[illegible]

Answer: No, because the two are not discriminated because of the superimposition of the qualities on the Self. (This answer is on the basis that the qualities are superimposed on the Self separately from the mind). The alternative explanation is that the mind with all the qualities is itself superimposed on the Self. In both cases there cannot be two kinds of agency, etc., as contended by the opponent.

\$104

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Thus it has been logically explained how the one Self can be the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowledge itself and the knower because of different limiting adjuncts. Therefore this is not the same as Vijñānavāda (as contended by the opponent—see para 51 above); nor is there any self-contradiction. Other such divisions will also be explained clearly in the sequel. Therefore, since the Self which is of the nature of pure consciousness remains constant in the state of deep sleep and since the body, senses, etc., are inconstant as well as objects of perception, the theories of various schools according to which various other entities are the

Self are erroneous. Thus it is established that the Upanishadic view alone is valid.

End of commentary on śloka 1. Commentary on Śloka 2

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The opponent may now say: “Let it be as you (Advaitin) say. But if the self is devoid of all qualities and the activities such as being a knower, etc., are based on superimposition, the statements in the Vedas such as ‘a Brahmana may perform a sacrifice’ will lose their validity. There is no possibility of action by the self which is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. If the Vedas lose their validity, how can the nature of Brahman be known, since Brahman can be known only through the Vedas, as is evident from Brahmasutra, 1.1.3, which says that the scriptures are the means for knowing Brahman. Therefore, in order that the Vedas may retain their validity, the activities such as knowership must be accepted as real”. Anticipating such an objection the Advaitin asks whether the Vedas are claimed to become invalid before the attainment of self-knowledge or after?

§106 本規則自中華民國八十四年一月一日起施行。

[illegible]

In the first alternative, since all means of knowledge are meant for those who are still under the control of nescience, and since identification with the body, etc., is not negated at that stage, there is no obstacle to their validity. In the second alternative, that is, after the attainment of self-knowledge, the invalidity of the Vedas is acceptable to us, as seen from the following verse:

“Neither the division into castes and stages of life, nor the rules of conduct and duties of the various castes and stages of life apply to me. I have no need for dhāraṇā, dhyāna or yoga, etc. Since the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ which are due to identification with the not-self have gone, I remain as the one auspicious self free from all attributes.”

§106 (cont.) _____

Caste means Brahmana, etc. The stages of life are Brahmacharya, etc. The rules of conduct relate to bathing, purity, etc. The duties are celibacy, service to the Guru, etc. Dharana means steadiness of the mind after withdrawal from external objects. Dhyana means contemplation of the supreme Self. Yoga means restraint of the modifications of the mind. By 'etc.' hearing, reflection, etc., are meant. The reason for the absence of all these after the dawn of knowledge is the removal of the notions of 'I' and 'mine' which are based on the not-self. The not-self is nescience which is opposed to the realization of the self. Since nescience which is the basis and the cause of the identifications in the form of 'I' and 'mine' is totally uprooted by the knowledge of the reality, the ideas of caste, stage of life, etc., which are born of nescience do not exist any longer.

Commentary on Śloka 3

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"The śrutis say that in deep sleep there is no mother, nor father, nor gods, nor the worlds, nor the Vedas, nor sacrifices, nor holy places. Nor is there total void, since I exist then as the one auspicious self free from all attributes."

[illegible]

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‘Mother’ means the female progenitor. ‘Father’ means the male progenitor. ‘Gods’ means those who are to be worshipped, such as Indra. ‘Worlds’ means the results of the worship of the gods, such as the attainment of heaven. ‘Vedas’ means the authoritative statements which describe the means of attaining what is good and avoiding what is evil, which cannot be known through the worldly means of knowledge and those statements which instruct about Brahman. ‘Sacrifices’ are the means of attaining heaven, etc., such as jyotishtoma. ‘Holy places’ are the places fit for sacrifices, such as Kurukshetra. Similarly, the absence (in deep sleep) of every thing that is the cause of sin should also be considered as implied here. The idea is that, since all these are the result of identification with the body, in the absence of such identification these do not exist, since the self by itself has no association with these.

§109 □□ □ □□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□ “□□□□ □□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□ □□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□” (□□.□. □.□.□□) □□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□ □

Thus the sruti says with regard to the state of deep sleep—“In this state the father is no father, the mother is no mother, the worlds are no worlds, the gods are no gods, the Vedas are not Vedas, a thief is no thief, the killer of a Brahmana is no more such a killer, a chandala (one who is born to a Sudra father and Brahmana mother) is no chandala, a paulkasa (one born to a Sudra father and a kshatriya mother) is no paulkasa, an ascetic is no ascetic, a hermit is no hermit; in this state one is not touched by virtue or vice, for he is then beyond all the sorrows of the heart” (Br. up. 4.3.22). Such statements stress the cessation of all evils when there is no identification with the body.

§110 □□□, □□□□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□ □□□□□ □ □, □□□□□ □□ — □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□ □ □□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□□ □ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□ □ □□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ □ □

Obj: If there is absence of all such relationships then it would be only a void. The answer is— No, because total non-existence of the self in deep sleep has been denied. The idea is that the denial refers emphatically to the condition of being non-existent. If there is only void in the state of deep sleep then waking up again would not be possible.

All that happens is that the self is not associated with the sense organs in deep sleep. From the sruti statements such as “This self is indeed imperishable and indestructible” (Br. up. 4.5.14), “He does not see then, because though seeing he does not see; the sight of the seer can never be lost, because it is imperishable. But then there is no second entity separated from it which he can see” (Br.up. 4.3.23), it follows that the self that is consciousness is not non-existent (or mere void) in deep sleep. Though this has already been denied earlier while rejecting the Buddhist doctrine of the void (see para 23 above), it is denied again, following the principle of “shaking the pole”.

Or, (since the Buddhist doctrine of the void has already been rejected in para 23 and so it is not necessary to refute it again), another meaning can be given. The meaning is that Brahman is beyond hunger, etc., (hunger and thirst, grief and delusion, old age and death), is without a second, and is beyond the void. Thus in deep sleep the jivatma is of the nature of Brahman. The sruti says:—“When a person sleeps he becomes united with Existence” (Ch. up. 6.8.1), “Just as a man, tightly embraced by his dear wife, does not know anything at all, either outside or inside, similarly this infinite entity (the self) closely embraced by the supreme Self, does not know anything at all, either outside or inside” (Br. up. 4.3.21). Therefore, since the jiva is united with Brahman which is the cause of the universe, omniscient, omnipotent, infinite bliss and consciousness, it follows that the jiva is not a transmigrating entity.

[illegible]

Thus, in three verses the import of the term 'thou' has been determined after refuting other contradictory views. Now the meaning of the term 'that' is to be similarly determined. The contradictory views that have to be refuted for this purpose are being indicated below.

Obj: The jiva cannot be identified with Brahman. This is explained. Brahman which is the cause of the universe and is denoted by the term 'sat' is described by statements such as "O dear one, in the beginning (before creation) this (universe) was 'sat' (existence) alone" (Ch.up. 6.2.1). The Sankhyas hold that the cause of the universe is 'Pradhana' which is insentient. The Pasupatas say that Pasupati alone is the cause of the universe and that, though he is sentient, he is different from the jiva and is to be worshipped by the jiva (Thus there is the difference in the form of worshipper and worshipped between the two). The followers of Pancharatra say that Lord Vasudeva is the cause of the universe; from him is born the jiva, Sankarshana; from him Pradyumna, the mind is born; from him Aniruddha, the ego. Therefore, jiva, being an effect, cannot be absolutely non-different from its cause, Vasudeva (or Brahman). (The relationship between cause and effect is difference-cum-non-difference. A pot is different from clay as a pot, but non-different as clay). The Jainas and the Tridandins are of the view that Brahman is subject to change, is eternal, omniscient, both different and non-different from the jiva. The Mimamsakas say that there is no such thing as Brahman endowed with omniscience, etc. Since the Vedas have action (in the form of rituals) as their purport, they do not have such a Brahman as their purport, but, like the statement, "Meditate on speech as a cow", the cause of the universe, which is the atoms, etc., or the jiva is to be worshipped. The Tarkikas hold that there is an Isvara who has

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Thus there being so many conflicting views, there arises doubt about the meaning of the term ‘that’. In order to determine the correct meaning according to the upanishads, which are the only basis left after rejecting the other views, the revered Acharya says:

[illegible]

The views of schools not specifically mentioned in the above verse should also be considered as rejected. The insentient Pradhana cannot certainly be the cause of the universe. The statement “It willed, ‘May I become many, may I procreate’” (Ch. 6.2.3) says that creation was preceded by the will (to create). By the statement, “Let me create names and forms by entering as this jivatma” (Ch. 6.3.2), the assumption of the form of the jivatma by

[illegible]

Thus the Paasupata, Paancharaatrika, and Jaina views are not valid because they are contradicted by sruti and reasoning. The Mimamsaka view that the sruti does not propound Brahman (as its main purport) because it is subservient to injunctions is also not tenable. (The Mimamsakas hold that Brahman is spoken of in the upanishads only for the purpose of upasana or worship because the object of the sruti is the performance of ritualistic actions and meditations for the purpose of the fulfillment of various desires). The subservience (of the upanishads) to the injunctions (in the karma kanda) is not established. The section (in Purvamimamsa) relating to 'Arthavada' does not support the claim of the Mimamsakas that the upanishads are subservient to the injunctions of the karma kanda, because there is no similarity (between the Arthavadas in the karma kanda and the statements about Brahman in the upanishads). An Arthavada which by itself is not productive of any result has to be attributed a meaning which will make it purposeful. For example, an Arthavada such as, "Vayu is indeed the

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§119 本條所稱之「公務員」指「公務員法」所稱之「公務員」及「公職人員」。

[illegible]

The reason why the views of all these schools have been declared as untenable is 'the absolutely pure nature of Brahman'. That is to say, Brahman is attributeless, non-dual, pure consciousness. The reason for this is the distinctive direct experience. This experience is different from conditioned experiences and is the realization of the infinite (partless) Brahman which arises from the statements such as "That thou art". Thus it is established that Brahman is all-pervading, non-dual, supreme bliss and consciousness.

Commentary on Śloka 5

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“Brahman has no such thing as upper or lower (part), it has no inside or outside, it has no middle or any ‘across’, and it has no

eastern or western direction, because it is all-pervading like space (or pervades space also). It is one and without parts. I remain as the one auspicious self free from all attributes.”

§122 ब्रह्मणोऽप्युपरः (part), etc., because it is all-pervading like space. The sruti says, “It is all-pervading like space and eternal”. Or, it pervades space also (so it is more pervasive than even space), as said in the sruti, “Greater than space” (Cha. 3.14.3), and “Greater than the great” (Katha. 1.2.20).

§123 ब्रह्मणोऽप्युपरः (part), etc., because it is all-pervading like space. The sruti says, “It is all-pervading like space and eternal”. Or, it pervades space also (so it is more pervasive than even space), as said in the sruti, “Greater than space” (Cha. 3.14.3), and “Greater than the great” (Katha. 1.2.20).

§124 ब्रह्मणोऽप्युपरः (part), etc., because it is all-pervading like space. The sruti says, “It is all-pervading like space and eternal”. Or, it pervades space also (so it is more pervasive than even space), as said in the sruti, “Greater than space” (Cha. 3.14.3), and “Greater than the great” (Katha. 1.2.20).

Though the jiva, too, is big because consciousness is seen to pervade the entire body, it is said to be only of the size of the point of a spear because of identification with the qualities of its limiting adjuncts. The sruti says, “The jiva is seen to be of the size of the point of a spear” (Sve. 5.8) only because of the qualities of the intellect though it is in itself unlimited. Brahman too is described as ‘atomic’ only in the sense of ‘subtle’. The meaning of the rest of the sloka is clear.

End of commentary on śloka 5.

Commentary on Śloka 6

§124 ब्रह्मणोऽप्युपरः (part), etc., because it is all-pervading like space. The sruti says, “It is all-pervading like space and eternal”. Or, it pervades space also (so it is more pervasive than even space), as said in the sruti, “Greater than space” (Cha. 3.14.3), and “Greater than the great” (Katha. 1.2.20).

ब्रह्मणोऽप्युपरः (part), etc., because it is all-pervading like space. The sruti says, “It is all-pervading like space and eternal”. Or, it pervades space also (so it is more pervasive than even space), as said in the sruti, “Greater than space” (Cha. 3.14.3), and “Greater than the great” (Katha. 1.2.20).

A doubt may arise that since Brahman is the material cause of the universe, and there is non-difference between the material cause and its effect, Brahman is non-different from the variegated universe and is therefore miserable by nature (since the universe is full of misery). Since the jiva is non-different from Brahman, it cannot attain the supreme Purushartha, liberation. This doubt is answered thus: Brahman is self-effulgent and is of the nature of supreme bliss. It is spoken of as the cause of the universe only

because it is the substratum of the delusive superimposition in the form of the entire universe. It, as the substratum, can have no relationship with what is superimposed. Therefore there is not the slightest trace of any evil in it (Brahman). So it is said:

“Brahman is not white, nor black, nor red, nor yellow; it is not tiny, nor big. It is neither short nor long. It is not knowable since it is of the nature of effulgence. I remain as the one auspicious self free from all attributes.”

[illegible]

Not white, etc. ‘Kubjam’ means tiny. ‘Pinam’ means big. By denying all these four magnitudes, namely, tiny, big, short, and long, it is denied that Brahman is a substance. ‘Arupam’ here means ‘what cannot be known by the senses or the mind’. By this the views held by various schools with regard to categories such as substance, quality, action are denied (in Brahman). (Brahman is not a substance, it has no quality and it has no activity). Thus the srutis such as, “It is neither big nor small, not short nor long, nor red” (Br. Up. 3.8.8), “That which is without sound, without touch, without colour, never diminishing, tasteless, eternal and odourless” (Katha. 1.3.15), describe the nature of the supreme Self as free from all evil.

[illegible]

In order to confirm the meaning of the sruti through reasoning also, the reason is given, “because it is of the nature of effulgence”. It means, “It is unknowable because it is self-effulgent and pure consciousness”. If it were knowable it would be an insentient object like a pot, etc. The sruti also says, “It is unknowable, unchanging” (Br. Up. 4.4.20).

End of commentary on śloka 6. Commentary on Śloka 7

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“பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா (of Sureshvaracharya) பற்றிச் சொல்லும் போது, ‘பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள்.”

பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா (of Sureshvaracharya) பற்றிச் சொல்லும் போது, ‘பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள்.

Obj: Who, according to you attains the nature of Brahman? Is it Brahman or non-Brahman? It cannot be the second, since it (non-Brahman) is insentient and unreal. It cannot be the first (Brahman) either, because in that case the instruction (about the means to attain the nature of Brahman) would be futile, because it has itself the nature of Brahman. If you say that though the jiva is itself of the nature of Brahman, but the obstruction (to its realization of its nature) in the form of nescience is removed by knowledge, it is not so. If the cessation of nescience is different from the atma (Brahman), duality will result, and in that case there can be no Brahman (who, according to you is without a second). Thus it has been said in Brihadaranyakopanishad Bhashyavartika (of Sureshvaracharya):— “The entity that is not different from anything else, and that cannot be found in anything else is called Brahman. If there were a second thing, then the word Brahman would not have any meaning. (Br. Va. 2.4.14). (The meaning is that Brahman is not different from anything else because there is nothing other than Brahman. So also, Brahman cannot be found in (or in association with) any other thing in the manner in which ‘ghatatva’, or the quality of being a pot, is found in all pots). It has already been said that if cessation of nescience is not different from Brahman, all the instruction about the realization of Brahman will not serve any purpose.

§128 பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா (of Sureshvaracharya) பற்றிச் சொல்லும் போது, ‘பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். —

பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா (of Sureshvaracharya) பற்றிச் சொல்லும் போது, ‘பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள்.

Reply:— Are you saying that the instruction does not serve any purpose from the standpoint of absolute reality or even from the empirical standpoint? If it is the former, it is replied that it is acceptable to us (since from the absolute standpoint the position is as below).

“There is neither teacher nor scriptures, neither student nor instruction, neither you nor I, nor this world. The knowledge of one’s real nature does not admit of different perceptions. I remain as the one auspicious self free from all attributes.”

§129 பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா (of Sureshvaracharya) பற்றிச் சொல்லும் போது, ‘பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா (of Sureshvaracharya) பற்றிச் சொல்லும் போது, ‘பாஷ்யாவர்த்திகா’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள். ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்பது ‘பாஷ்ய’ என்ற சொல்லின் ‘வர்த்திகா’ என்ற பொருள்.

‘Sasta’ means the Guru who instructs. ‘Sastram’ is the means of instruction. ‘Sishya’ is the object of instruction. ‘Siksha’ is the act of instruction. ‘Tvam’

means the listener. 'Aham' means the speaker. The purport is that this world revealed by all the means of knowledge, the body, senses, etc., (which are the cause of) all adversities, do not have a real existence.

[illegible]

"I am not a person who can be easily moved by words or actions. I am a person who can be moved by the truth." —

[illegible]

The second alternative is now refuted. Even though no purpose is served by debating whether the cessation of nescience is identical with the self or the not-self, the realization of one's real nature, which is the result of knowledge, is actually experienced. There is no need to debate how this happens, because debate becomes impossible when all duality has been destroyed. There can indeed be no illogicality in a matter of actual experience. Thus the sruti statements such as, "There is no dissolution, nor origination, no enlightened nor aspirant; there is no seeker after liberation, nor liberated. This is the reality" (Mandukya karika, 2.32), "Brahman alone was there in the beginning; it knew itself as 'I am Brahman'. Therefore it became everything" (Br. Up. 1.4.10), show that the jiva which was even earlier of the nature of Brahman attained the nature of Brahman through knowledge. They also deny all duality.

End of commentary on śloka 7.

Commentary on Śloka 8

[illegible]

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Obj: Since the Self should always remain the same because it is self-luminous pure consciousness, how can there be such distinctions as waking,

dream and deep sleep? It cannot be said that these distinctions are due only to delusion, because in that case everything would become dream.

Answer: It is not so. Though all the three states have the character of dream, from the empirical point of view there is difference caused by nescience. These distinctions are quite appropriate because these states are not totally non-existent and have specific characteristics. From the standpoint of reality, however, there are no such differences at all. So it is said:

“I do not have the state of waking, nor of dream, nor of deep sleep. I am not Viśva, or Taijasa, or Prāñña. Because all these three states are only the products of ignorance, I am the fourth (beyond these three states). I remain as the one auspicious self free from all attributes.”

[illegible]

The items in the above verse are stated in the order of dissolution. In our view (Advaita) there are only two categories, namely, the seer and the seen. All the categories propounded by other schools are included in these.

[illegible]

Of these two, the seer is the Self, the reality, one only, and though always the same, it is threefold because of difference caused by limiting adjuncts. These are Isvara, jiva and the witness. Isvara has nescience which is the cause (of the universe) as limiting adjunct. The jiva has as limiting adjunct nescience limited by the inner organ (mind) and the samskaras (impressions) in it. This has already been described earlier (See para 72). In the view in which Isvara is the reflection in nescience, the original (i.e. the consciousness which is reflected) is known as the witness. In the view in which Isvara is the reflection (of consciousness), the consciousness which permeates the jiva as well as Isvara in the same manner as the form of the face permeates the original face and its reflection (in a mirror), and which is aware of everything is called the witness. In the view of the Vartikakara Isvara himself is the witness and so the seer is only twofold, as Isvara and jiva.

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በጥንታዊ የጥንቃቄ ሂደት ውስጥ” በሚለው ሂደት

“To Brahman who is pure consciousness, without a second, without parts, without a body, forms are attributed to enable worship by devotees.”

The jiva is also threefold, as Visva, Taijasa and Praajna, differentiated by the secondary difference caused by their different limiting adjuncts. The jiva limited by avidya, the inner organ (subtle body) and the gross body, who identifies himself with the waking state, is known as Visva. The same jiva, devoid of identification with the gross body, and limited by the two adjuncts (avidya and subtle body), who identifies himself with the dream state is known as Taijasa. When the jiva is devoid of the two limitations of the gross body and the subtle body, is limited only by avidya which is limited by the samskaras in the mind, and is identified with the state of deep sleep, he is called Praajna. The jiva (in all the three states) is only one, and there is no

difference in the jiva himself because there are no independent limiting adjuncts for each of these states. Still, because there are these secondary differences due to different limiting adjuncts, the same jiva is referred to by different names in the different states. The witnessing consciousness, however, is only of one nature, who is aware of everything, permeates everything, and is called the 'fourth' (because he is beyond the three states). There is no difference in him even with different limiting adjuncts (for the jiva in the three states), because his limiting adjunct is of the same nature.

[illegible]

Nescience, all that is dependent on it, and all its effects, constitute the universe, which is connoted by the word 'seen'. Though it is not real from the absolute standpoint, it is accepted to have empirical reality. So examination of the universe is not futile like the examination of dream objects (which serves no purpose). It is useful for the purpose of worship, etc. The universe is also threefold, as (1) the unmanifest, (2) the gross, and (3) the subtle.

[illegible]

Of these three, what is denoted by the term 'unmanifest' is nescience with the reflection of consciousness in it, which is the power that is the seed of the universe of gross and subtle objects. It is called unmanifest because it, along with the connection between consciousness and nescience, the distinction as Isvara and jivas, and the reflection of consciousness in nescience, which are all dependent on nescience, is beginningless. Even though these three are not the effects of nescience, they cease to exist the moment nescience ceases, and so it has been said that they are dependent on nescience. That (nescience), though itself insentient, is illumined by the reflection of consciousness which is not insentient and generates, being impelled by the impressions of the acts of jivas in past births (samskaras), the five subtle elements, space, air, fire, water, and earth, which are of the nature of sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, respectively. Nescience which has taken the form of the previous element is the cause of the next

[illegible][illegible]

The five elements before the process of quintuplication which are called subtle are constituted of the three gunas, sattva, rajas, and tamas, since they are identical with their cause (maya or avidya). When sattva aspect is predominant in them these five elements together generate a pure substance which has the powers of knowledge and action and is multifaceted, as it were. The aspect of that substance where the power of knowledge is predominant is the inner organ (mind). The aspect in which the power of action is predominant is praana. It is fivefold, as praana, apaana, vyaana, udaana, and samaana. Thus, from each element arise two different organs, one with the power of knowledge and the other with the power of action. From space arise the sense of hearing and speech, from air the sense of touch and the hands, from fire the sense of sight and feet, from water the sense of taste and the organ of excretion, from earth the sense of smell and the organ of procreation.

Here some hold that speech arises from fire because of the sruti statement “Speech is made up of fire” (Ch. 6.5.4) and that the feet are from space. We however consider that, since both speech and the ear manifest sound, they should both arise from space. Since any ailment in the eye gets cured when the soles of the feet are treated, it is appropriate that the feet also arise from fire like the eye. The sruti statement that speech is made up of fire should be interpreted as meaning that fire (oil consumed) helps speech, just as the mind, which arises from a combination of all the five elements, is said to be made up of food because food helps to nourish the mind. It is another matter that the mind is said to be born of all the five elements together because it grasps the qualities of all the five elements and so it must be constituted of all of them.

The presiding deities of all the organs of perception have predominantly the power of knowledge and presiding deities of all the organs of action have predominantly the power of action. The quarters and fire, Wind and Indra, the Sun and Vishnu, Varuna and Mitra, the Asvini devas and Prajapati, are these deities. The mind is the totality of the power of knowledge. Praana is the totality of the power of action. The five organs of perception, namely, ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose perceive respectively sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. The skin and eyes perceive also the substance which is the locus of the qualities they grasp. The ear, like the eye, grasps sound by going to the place of location of the sound. This is clear from the fact that one knows that a particular sound arises in a faraway place. The organs of action, namely, organ of speech, hands, feet, organ of excretion and organ of procreation, perform the acts of speaking, grasping, moving, excretion, and producing pleasure respectively.

All these, i.e. the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, the five vital airs (praana, apaana, etc.), and the two divisions of the inner organ (mind and intellect), making a total of seventeen, form the subtle body. This is known as Hiranyagarbha when prominence is given to the power of knowledge and Sutra when prominence is given to the power of action. This subtle entity, being an effect, is the limiting adjunct of the jiva in the microcosm as well as the macrocosm.

Such subtle elements are incapable of producing a body which is the seat of all experiences and the sense-objects without which experiences are not possible. So in order to become gross the subtle elements undergo the process of quintuplication (pancheekaranam), being impelled by the karma of the jivas. Each of the five subtle elements is divided into two equal parts. One half of each such element is divided into four equal parts (i.e. to get one-eighth of each element). Then one half of each element is combined with one-eighth of each of the other four elements to make a gross element. Each such gross element is named space, etc., according to the element that is predominant in it.

Here some (such as Vachaspathimisra, author of Bhamati) accept only triplication because of the sruti statement, "Let me make each one threefold" (Ch. 6.3.3), and Brahma-sutra, 2.4.20, "The creation of names and forms is by Him who does the triplication", and also because only the combination of three elements is actually perceived. This view has been

refuted by the reasoning given in the Brahma-sutras under the topic relating to space (Br. Su. 2.3.1 to 7). Moreover, since Taittiriya Upanishad, 2.1.1, says, “From that Brahman, which is the Self, space was produced”, while in the Chandogya Upanishad only the creation of the three elements, fire, water, and earth is mentioned, the statements in the two Upanishads have to be reconciled. In this respect the rule is that the inclusion of the categories, space and air, is more important than giving the first place in creation to fire. Thus the statement about triplication can be justified only as a statement referring to a part of the process, since actually all the five elements created have been combined. If triplication alone is accepted it will lead to the defect of being a divergent statement.

§145 “नामरूपमिदं ब्रह्म” (ब्र.सु. २.३.२०.) इति पञ्चतन्मयं ब्रह्म
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Brahma-sutra, 2.4.20, “The creation of names and forms is by Him who does the triplication”, is only an explanatory statement and so it cannot nullify quintuplication which is established by reasoning. Sri Sankara has said (in the work named Panchcheekaranam) that the combination of all the five elements is experienced in the body, etc., without any difference. Therefore the discussion about the not-self need not be continued further.

§146 पञ्चतन्मयं ब्रह्म पञ्चतन्मयं ब्रह्मपञ्चतन्मयं ब्रह्मपञ्चतन्मयं
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These quintuplicated elements, which are called ‘gross’, combine and produce as their effect that which is the locus of the sense organs and the seat of experiences (of the jiva). This is what is called the body. Sattva guna is predominant in the body of gods. Rajoguna is predominant in the human body. Tamoguna is predominant in the bodies of animals and other creatures upto those of stationary creatures such as trees and plants. Even though all bodies are made up of the same five elements, there is no contradiction in the proportion of the elements being more or less in different bodies, as in a multicoloured object. Similarly, objects of sense are also the products of the various quintuplicated elements. So also are the fourteen worlds which are above, in the middle and below, and vary according to the predominance of sattva, rajas and tamas, and objects such

as pots, etc. All these together are known as Brahmanda, which is also called Virat, and gross. This is the order of creation according to the Upanishads.

[illegible]

The order of dissolution (merging) is the opposite. The gross, which is made up of the five quintuplicated elements and their effects, and which is known as Virat, merges in its cause, the subtle, known as Hiranyagarbha, which is constituted of the five subtle elements before quintuplication, by the merger of each element, starting from the earth, in its cause, the preceding element. This is the daily pralaya. The subtle also merges in the unmanifest, which is the limiting adjunct of Isvara. The unmanifest, being beginningless, has no cause and so it has no merging, since merging means remaining in its own cause in a subtle form. The merging of the subtle in the unmanifest is Praakrita pralaya. The dissolution resulting from the realization of Brahman is the absolute pralaya (liberation) by the destruction of the cause (nescience) itself. When the cause itself is destroyed its effects are also totally destroyed. Though all creation, dissolution, etc., is unreal like the creation and dissolution in dream, they are fit for empirical dealings because of the firmness of the impressions from past lives (vasanas) that generate a conviction of the reality of the universe. Though they are due to maya, they are not absolutely non-existent (like the horns of a rabbit). How this is so is made clear in the Bhashya.

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This being so, the basis of the distinctions such as the waking state, etc., is now described. The waking state is that in which the sense organs function and objects are experienced. Then the empirical objects are experienced by the jiva who is known as Visva, because the objects of experience which are gross and are called Virat, are known through the six means of knowledge starting with direct perception. The jiva is called Visva because of having

[illegible]

§150 1. 2019. gada 1. janvārī spēkā stāšies šādi noteikumi:

In this context some hold the view that the mind itself appears in the form of elephants, horses, etc., and that these are known by a modification (vritti) of avidya. Others hold that it is avidya itself that becomes transformed in the form of the objects seen in dream, as in the case of the appearance of

naacre-silver, etc., and that they are also known by a modification of avidya. Which view is better? It is the second, because everywhere it is avidya that is considered as the material cause of the superimposition of illusory objects as well as the superimposition of illusory cognition. In some texts the mind is said to be transformed as the objects, but that is only because the transformation is due to the vasanās in the mind, which are considered to be the efficient cause.

[illegible]

Obj: Suppose we say that, if the mind is not accepted as taking the form of objects during dream, it could then become the knower, and then the Self cannot be said to be itself the light (in the dream state). Answer: It is not so. In the dream state the mind cannot know anything because the external sense organs do not function then. It is an invariable rule that the mind can know external objects only with the help of the external sense organs. Only when pure consciousness has as its limiting adjunct the mind with modifications (vritti) can it be a knower. So, even though the mind is present in the dream state, the jiva is not a knower then.

[illegible]

What is the substratum on which the dream objects are superimposed? Some say that it is the jiva, who is consciousness limited by the mind. Others hold that it is Brahman limited by primal ignorance. Which view is correct? Both, depending on different points of view.

[illegible]

(The arguments against the second view and in support of the first view are now being stated)- If Brahman is the substratum, then the dream objects will not disappear on waking up, because any delusion will cease only when the substratum of the delusion is known. Brahman cannot be known on waking up every day. If Brahman is known, then the entire duality will disappear, and not only the dream objects. Moreover, the sruti says, "He (the jiva) is the creator (of the dream objects)" (Br.Up.4.3.10). Brahman limited by primal ignorance i.e. Isvara is the creator of the entire universe

starting with space. So Brahman limited by primal ignorance cannot be the substratum of the dream objects.

[illegible]

Obj: Since the jiva-consciousness is not covered, and is always fully manifest, how can it be the substratum of an illusion? What you say is true (that the jiva is manifest). But we postulate a modal ignorance which is favourable to the appearance of illusion in the dream state, but prevents the knowledge of the dealings in the empirical state. In the dream state the knowledge in the form 'I am a man', etc., is with regard to a body different from that in the waking state; so also the knowledge 'I am lying on a bed' is also with reference to a different bed from that in the waking state. The means of knowledge (the external senses) are absent in respect of both kinds of knowledge.

[illegible]

Obj: Since the knowledge of empirical matters such as 'I am a man' is not the product of any valid means of knowledge, how can it cause the cessation of the modal ignorance? If you say that the cessation of this ignorance is due to the waking state being a different state, then knowledge which negates the dream experiences should arise in deep sleep also, since that is also a different state from dreaming. That is not acceptable, because in that case the deep sleep state would be equated with the waking state. That is very cleverly said! The deep sleep state is nothing but the modal ignorance pertaining to the dream state accompanied by the dormancy of the mind and so there is no destruction of the modal ignorance of the dream state then.

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In the waking state, however, there is the experience that the appearances in dream were illusory, and so even though the knowledge 'I am a man' is

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[illegible]

The substratum of the dream is Brahman-consciousness limited by the mind. In this view also since the modal ignorance is accepted to be covering

it, there is no inconsistency. That is why it is stated so in some places in the scriptures.

[illegible]

The enjoyer of the dream objects is known as ‘Taijasa’ because of the prominence of the brilliance called bile, or because it shines even without the help of lights such as the sun.

[illegible]

When the jiva is tired after experiencing objects in the two states of waking and dream, and when the karma which is the cause of these two states is exhausted, the inner organ which is characterized by the power to know and has vasanās in it goes into its causal state. This is the state of deep sleep which is the place of rest. Deep sleep is the state in which there is awareness of the cause (ignorance) alone, as indicated by the recollection (on waking up) in the form 'I knew nothing at all'. In that state, even though there is no knowledge of the objects of experience of the waking and dream states, three modifications of nescience, namely, the witness, happiness, and modal ignorance pertaining to that state are accepted as present. In deep sleep there is no single particularized vṛtti because there is no ego-sense then. If there were such an ego-sense then it would not be deep sleep.

[illegible]

Since there is no ground for the assumption that an awareness in the form of an avidyavritti exists during pralaya, what has been said in respect of deep sleep does not apply to pralaya and so the defect of over-applicability does not arise. The person waking up from sleep recollects that he slept happily and did not know anything. Recollection is not possible of a thing not previously experienced. Even though the recollection is not accompanied by the 'that-ness', it cannot be said that it is not a recollection, since the absence of such details is attributable to the fact that the

experience was not caused by a vritti of the mind. Moreover, there is no invariable rule that in every recollection such details must be present. Besides, in the waking state, experience in the form 'I slept' is not possible. Inference is also not possible because both the reason and the locus are absent.

[illegible]

The ego-sense is experienced only at the time of waking up. Since the mind is dormant in deep sleep the ego-sense is not experienced then and so there can be no recollection of any such ego-sense. When a face is reflected in a mirror on which the redness of a hibiscus flower has been superimposed, a cognition in the form 'the face is red' arises. Similarly, since the witness-consciousness is the substratum of the recollection by virtue of its being the substratum of ego-sense, the cognition 'I slept happily' arises, in which 'I' and 'slept happily' are in grammatical coordination. The witness-consciousness in this case is, however, not the substratum in the same manner as in the experience 'I am happy'.

[illegible]

As a rule, the witness-consciousness is the substratum of recollection, doubt, and wrong knowledge. The ego-sense is invariably the substratum of knowledge arising through a valid means of knowledge. The distinguishing characteristic of a knowledge arising from the ego-sense is that it is correct knowledge. When avidya is the cause of a knowledge, it has the characteristic of being wrong knowledge. Because of this it has been held by masters of Vedanta that the indirect illusion which results from the words of an unreliable person is also due to avidyavritti.

[illegible]

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

The impressions do not fall in the category of the material cause of the effects which have the witness-consciousness as their substratum. Therefore there is no difference in the witness-consciousness even though the impressions are different. In the waking state, however, since the inner organ falls in the category of the material cause of the effect which has the knower as its substratum, there are different knowers. Since the knower is none other than the witness himself with an additional limiting adjunct, there is no inconsistency in the knower remembering.

§170 _____

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The Vartikakara says in Brihadaranyaka vartika, 3.4. 54-55:- “The witness does not differ from one body to another even though the knower and the means of knowledge are different, just as an external object is not cognized differently by different persons. Therefore he is known as the ‘atma’. The knower, etc., who are witnessed by the witnessing consciousness may change, but the atma does not undergo any change because it is also the witness of the absence of the knower, means of knowledge, etc.”. Since the revered Vartikakara denies difference in the witness even in the empirical state, it has to be concluded that difference in the witness in the deep sleep state postulated by some is only due to sheer delusion.

[illegible]

Obj: Sometimes some one may get a recollection in the form 'I slept unhappily' and so there could be experience of unhappiness also in deep sleep. Answer: That is not possible because during deep sleep the factors that cause sorrow do not exist. But happiness, being the very nature of the self, is ever existent. There may be unhappiness in a secondary sense because of the unsatisfactory nature of the bed, etc.

[illegible]

Or, there can be sorrow even in sleep if it is accepted that each of the three states is itself threefold. Thus, when there is knowledge through a valid means, it is waking in the waking state. When there is delusion like that of shell-silver, it is dream in the waking state. When because of fatigue there is torpor, it is sleep in the waking state. Similarly when in dream one receives a mantra, etc., it is waking in the dream state. When during a dream a person feels that he is seeing a dream, it is dream in the dream state. When something that cannot be described in the waking state is vaguely experienced in dream, then it is sleep in the dream state. Similarly in the state of deep sleep when there is a sattvic vritti of the nature of happiness, it is waking in sleep. Then there is the recollection 'I slept happily'. At that time when there is a rajasic vritti, it is dream in sleep. Only thereafter there may arise a recollection in the form 'I slept unhappily'. In that when there is a tamasic vritti, it is sleep in the deep sleep state. Thereafter there is the recollection 'I was totally ignorant'. This is how it has been clearly described in works such as Vasishthayartika.

Thus the microcosm is Visva, the corresponding macrocosm is Virat, and the corresponding deity is Vishnu. The microcosm is the waking state, the function of the corresponding deity is sustenance, and the macrocosm is sattvaguna. Similarly with Taijasa corresponding to Hiranyagarbha and Brahma, dream to creation and rajoguna. And Praajna corresponding to the unmanifest and Rudra, deep sleep to dissolution and tamoguna. Since the microcosm, macrocosm and the deity are all one and the same, by meditation on these along with the three limbs of pranava (a,u,m) as identical even when limited by the corresponding adjuncts, the world of Hiranyagarbha is attained. Then, by the acquisition of purity of mind gradual liberation (kramamukti) is attained. By negating all these limiting

adjuncts and by the knowledge of the pure witness-consciousness direct liberation is attained.

[illegible]

Thus all the three, Visva, Taijasa, and Praajna, along with the three states are all due to nescience, and so, being objects of knowledge they are unreal. So the conclusion is that 'I am the unconditioned pure witness, known as the fourth'. Thus, even though empirically all the distinctions are accountable, in reality there are no such distinctions at all and so there is no inconsistency. This has been dealt with elaborately by us in Vedantakalpalatika and so the matter is concluded here.

End of commentary on śloka 8.

Commentary on Śloka 9

[illegible][illegible]

Obj: Anticipating the doubt that since the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep and the entities identified with them are unreal, their witness would also be unreal because there is no distinction, the reality of the witness is declared by bringing out the distinction:

“The witness is all-pervading, is the desired goal, is self-existent, and is not dependent on any thing else, while the entire universe which is different from it is unreal. I remain as the one auspicious self free from all attributes.”

§176 “□ □□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□” (□□.□. □.□.□.) □□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□□□
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About the witness it is said, "You cannot see the seer of sight" (Br.Up.3.4.2). The sruti says, "Everything else is perishable" (Br.Up.3.4.2). So the entire universe, which is different from the witness and is the witnessed, is unreal.

but not the witness, because it is beyond any possibility of sublation, is known as the substratum of the illusion, and there is no one who can testify to its sublation. The word 'api' should be taken to denote all the other characteristics of the witness which are not mentioned here.

[illegible]

In view of the sruti statement “What is limited is mortal” (Cha.Up. 7.24.1), limitedness and unreality are co-extensive, and so when limitedness is denied unreality is also denied. So it has been said: ‘since it is all-pervading’. By the statement ‘All this is indeed Brahman’ which says that it is everything, unlimitedness in space and time is brought out. Space, though limited in space and time, is said to be pervasive in a secondary sense because of its comparative bigness.

[illegible]

Obj: Since Atma is all-pervading and therefore eternal, and is positive in nature, it cannot be of the nature of removal of sorrow. Nor can it be of the nature of happiness. No, because it is referred to as supremely beneficial, which is sought after by human beings.

[illegible]

The sruti statements such as, “This self is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, innermost” (Br. Up. 1.4.8), “That which is infinite is alone happiness” (Cha. Up. 7.23.1), “This itself is supreme bliss” (Br. Up. 4.3.33), “Brahman is consciousness and bliss” (Br. Up. 3.9.28), declare that the self is of the nature of supreme bliss. Though it is eternal, it is spoken of in the world in a secondary sense as arising and ending when it is manifested by an appropriate vritti of the mind.

§180 § 180.001. Definitions. In this article, the following definitions apply:

in the form 'I know' and not 'I am knowledge'. Then how can there be the theory of non-duality? Answer: No, because it has no dependence on any locus.

[illegible]

In accordance with the sruti statements, “Brahman that is direct and immediate, the Atma that is within all” (Br. Up. 3.4.1), the Atma is self-effulgent consciousness-bliss. Because of identification of the consciousness with the mind, consciousness is attributed to the vritti of the mind. As a result the cognition takes the form ‘I know’ and seems to be dependent on the mind. The meaning of the root and the origin and destruction pertain only to the vritti of the mind. The pure consciousness which is the substratum of everything is not dependent on any thing else and so there is no duality. Therefore it is established that the Atma which is consciousness-bliss is real and the entire universe which is different from it is unreal.

End of commentary on śloka 9.

Commentary on Śloka 10

[illegible]

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If the entire universe is non-existent, then by denying it the truth of the Atma cannot be known. There is no need to deny the existence of the horn of a rabbit. As a rule it is only a thing that is known by some valid means of knowledge to exist somewhere that may be denied somewhere else. Thus, since its denial is illogical, the universe is not non-existent. Answer: No. It is said:

“It is not one; how can there be a second different from it? It has neither absoluteness nor non-absoluteness. It is neither void nor non-void since it is devoid of duality. How can I describe that which is established by the entire Vedanta!”

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

While by the two terms ‘one’ and ‘without a second’ the existence of any thing else of the same species or a different species is denied, by the term ‘only’ (eva) all differences such as the difference between a quality and the possessor of a quality are denied. The reason for all these is given as —‘because of being devoid of duality’. What is divided into two is ‘dual’. The state of being dual is duality. It has been said in the Vartika: “What is divided into two is said to be ‘dual’ and such a state is called ‘duality’ (Br. Vartika. 4.3.186). Where there is no duality or the state of being divided into two, that is non-duality. This is the literal meaning. As the sruti says, “Like water, one, the seer and free from duality” (Br. Up. 4.3.32).

Since it is only the knowledge of the counter-correlative that is the cause of easily becoming aware of the absence of some thing, and since duality has been accepted as indeterminable, denial is quite logical because the objects are knowable through the means of knowledge such as perception.

In that case please indicate such an Atma by pointing it out with the finger. It is not possible; it has been said, “How can I describe”. ‘How’ indicates impossibility. Being non-dual it cannot become an object of speech. The srutis, “He explained without words” (Nr.Uttara Tapani Up. 7), “That from which words return without attaining it, along with the mind” (Tai. Up. 2.4.1), “You cannot know the knower of knowledge” (Br. Up. 3.4.2), indicate this.

If it is asked, how can Vedanta be the valid means of knowledge if the Atma cannot become the object of speech, the answer is: Even though the Atma is not an object, ignorance about it is destroyed by a mere vritti of the mind of the form of the Atma. This is expressed by the term 'That which is established by the entire Vedanta'.

The srutis such as, “It is known to him to whom it is not an object of knowledge; he who thinks he knows it does not know. It is unknown to those who think they know it well, and known to those who know that they do not know it” (Kena. 2.3), “That which is not comprehended by the mind, but that by which the mind is said to comprehend, know that alone to be Brahman and not that which is worshipped” (Kena. 1.6), show that the Atma is not an object.

Thus it is established that when avidya is destroyed by the vritti in the form of the indivisible Atman generated by the statements of Vedanta, all the sufferings that are imagined because of avidya come to an end, and one remains as supreme bliss, having attained the ultimate aim.

Concluding Verses

I do not praise Vyasa who did not bind together the entire content (of Vedanta) well even with threads (aphorisms). I bow down to Sankara and Suresvara who strung together the entire meaning even without them. (Or, I not only praise Vyasa but also bow down to Sankara and Suresvara who brought out the meaning of the aphorisms).

This treatise by Madhusudana Sarasvati meant for the delight of the good, though small in size, is abundant in content, like the wish-yielding gem Chintamani.

Whatever is there of excellence in this is the guru's and not mine. Whatever is not felicitous is mine and not the guru's.

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This short treatise has been composed by me for Balabhadra (my disciple) after repeated requests by him. Let the generous and discerning people examine and decide what is correct and what is not in this.

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[illegible]

**Here ends the Siddhāntabindu composed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,
disciple of the most revered Paramahansa Parivrājaka Śrī Viśveśvara
Ācārya**